Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. Reminds Investors That Class Action Lawsuits Have Been Filed Against Credit Suisse, Riskified, Netflix, and Mullen and Encourages Investors to Contact the Firm

NEW YORK, May 13, 2022 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., a nationally recognized shareholder rights law firm, reminds investors that class actions have been commenced on behalf of stockholders of Credit Suisse Group AG (NYSE: CS), Riskified Ltd. (NYSE: RSKD), Netflix, Inc. (NASDAQ: NFLX), and Mullen Automotive, Inc. (NASDAQ: MULN). Stockholders have until the deadlines below to petition the court to serve as lead plaintiff. Additional information about each case can be found at the link provided.

Credit Suisse Group AG (NYSE: CS)

Class Period: March 19, 2021 – March 25, 2022

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: June 28, 2022

Credit Suisse, together with its subsidiaries, provides various financial services in Switzerland, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, the Americas, and Asia Pacific. The Company offers private banking and wealth management solutions, including advisory, investment, financial planning, succession planning, and trust services, and financing and lending, and multi-shore platform solutions.

Credit Suisse has a history of business dealings with Russian oligarchs, or ultra-high net worth business leaders possessing significant political influence. For example, an article published by Financial Times on February 7, 2022, entitled “Credit Suisse securitizes yacht loans to oligarchs and tycoons”, cited a recent investor presentation for a synthetic securitization deal, in which Credit Suisse sold off $80 million worth of risk related to a $2 billion portfolio of loans backed by assets owned by certain of the bank’s ultra-high net worth clients (the “Securitization Deal”), which disclosed that, in 2017 and 2018, Credit Suisse experienced 12 defaults on yacht and aircraft loans, a third of which were related to U.S. sanctions against Russian oligarchs. Press reports at the time indicated that Russian billionaires Oleg Deripaska, Arkady Rotenberg, and Boris Rotenberg had to terminate private jet leases with Credit Suisse in those years.

Beginning in or around October 2021, Russia commenced a major military build-up near the Russo-Ukrainian border, in apparent preparation for an invasion of Ukraine. Although the Russian government repeatedly denied it had plans to invade or attack Ukraine, the U.S. later released intelligence of Russian invasion plans, including satellite photographs showing Russian troops and equipment near the Russo-Ukrainian border.

In November 2021, as Russia’s military buildup on the Russo-Ukrainian border continued, the Company entered the Securitization Deal.

Just months later, on February 24, 2022, Russian military forces invaded Ukraine. In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, Western governments including, among others, the U.S., Canada, and the European Union, imposed significant sanctions on Russia. The sanctions included, inter alia, measures targeting Russia’s ultrawealthy oligarchs by denying them access to the global financial system and by, in some cases, authorizing the seizure of certain of their high-value assets located outside of Russia.

Barely a week after the commencement of the Russian invasion and the retaliatory sanctions imposed by Western nations, news outlets reported that Credit Suisse had requested non-participating investors who received information about the Company’s loan portfolio to destroy and permanently erase any confidential information that Credit Suisse provided to them regarding the Securitization Deal.

The complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and misleading statements regarding the Company’s business, operations, and compliance policies. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Credit Suisse had deficient disclosure controls and procedures and internal control over financial reporting; (ii) Credit Suisse’s practice of lending money to Russian oligarchs subject to U.S. and international sanctions created a significant risk of violating rules pertaining to those sanctions and future sanctions; (iii) the foregoing conduct subjected the Company to an increased risk of heightened regulatory scrutiny and/or enforcement actions; (iv) the Securitization Deal concerned loans that Credit Suisse made to Russian oligarchs previously sanctioned by the U.S.; (v) the purpose of the Securitization Deal was to offload the risks associated with these loans and mitigate the impact on Credit Suisse of sanctions likely to be implemented by Western nations in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; (vi) Credit Suisse’s request that non-participating investors destroy documents related to the Securitization Deal was intended to conceal the Company’s noncompliance with U.S. and international sanctions in its lending practices; (vii) the foregoing, once revealed, was likely to subject the Company to enhanced regulatory scrutiny and significant reputational harm; and (viii) as a result, the Company’s public statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

On March 28, 2022, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Reform sent Credit Suisse a letter asking the Company to turn over information and documents about a portfolio of loans backed by yachts and private jets owned by clients, potentially including sanctioned Russian individuals. In the letter, House Oversight Chair Carolyn Maloney and Rep. Stephen Lynch, chair of the Subcommittee on National Security, questioned Credit Suisse’s request that hedge funds and other non-participating investors “destroy documents” related to yachts and private jets owned by the bank’s clients. “Given the timing of this request and its subject matter,” the House Democrats wrote, “Credit Suisse’s action raises significant concerns that it may be concealing information” about whether participants in the deal may be “evading sanctions” imposed by the West after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

On this news, Credit Suisse’s stock price fell $0.21 per share, or 2.58%, to close at $7.94 per share on March 28, 2022.

For more information on the Credit Suisse class action go to: http://bespc.com/cases/CS

Riskified Ltd. (NYSE: RSKD)

Class Period: Pursuant to the Jul 28, 2021 IPO

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: July 1, 2022

Riskified operates a risk management platform that utilizes machine learning to protect its merchant-clients from fraud. On July 1, 2021, Riskified filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) a registration statement on Form F-1 for the IPO, which, after several amendments, was declared effective on July 28, 2021 (the “Registration Statement”). The Registration Statement was used to sell to the investing public 20.125 million Riskified Class A ordinary shares at $21 per share, generating over $422 million in gross proceeds.

The Riskified class action lawsuit alleges that the IPO’s Registration Statement made inaccurate statements of material fact because they failed to disclose the following adverse facts that existed at the time of the IPO: (i) as Riskified expanded its user base, the quality of Riskified’s machine learning platform had deteriorated (rather than improved as represented in the Registration Statement), because of, among other things, inaccuracies in the algorithms associated with onboarding new merchants and entering new geographies and industries; (ii) Riskified had expanded its customer base into industries with relatively high rates of fraud – including partnerships with cryptocurrency and remittance business – in which Riskified had limited experience and that this expansion has negatively impacted the effectiveness of Riskified’s machine learning platform; (iii) as a result, Riskified was suffering from materially higher chargebacks and cost of revenue and depressed gross profits and gross profit margins during its third fiscal quarter of 2021; and (iv) thus, the Registration Statement’s representations regarding Riskified’s historical financial and operational metrics and purported market opportunities did not accurately reflect the actual business, operations, and financial results and trajectory of Riskified prior to and at the time of the IPO, and were materially false and misleading, and lacked a factual basis.

On September 9, 2021, during a conference call to discuss Riskified’s financial results for the second quarter ended June 30, 2021, Riskified’s CFO, defendant Aglika Dotcheva, stated that Riskified tended “to experience higher chargebacks when we enter a new industry.”

Then, on November 16, 2021, Riskified announced its third quarter ended September 30, 2021 results, revealing that Riskified’s revenue growth had declined to 26% year-over-year, Riskified’s Gross Merchandise Value (“GMV”) growth had declined to 28% year-over-year, Riskified’s gross profits had increased only 10% year-over-year, Riskified’s gross profit margins had plummeted to just 46% during the quarter, and Riskified’s gross profit fell sequentially to $24.3 million. Further, Riskified’s cost of revenue had jumped to $28.3 million in the third quarter of 2021, primarily as a result of a sharp increase in chargeback expenses. During the earnings call, defendant Dotcheva blamed Riskified’s growing merchant base as a primary cause of increased chargebacks.

Finally, on February 23, 2022, Riskified announced its fourth quarter and year ended December 31, 2021 results, disclosing that Riskified’s revenue growth and GMV growth had continued to decelerate, Riskified’s gross profit growth remained muted, and Riskified’s cost of revenue had continued to climb. Riskified also revealed that it expected to generate only between $254 million and $257 million in 2022 revenues (which would represent only 11.5% year-over-year growth) and an adjusted 2022 earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization of between negative $69 million and $66 million (which would more than triple the losses suffered by Riskified in 2021), indicating that the adverse business trends being suffered by Riskified were in fact accelerating. During the earnings call the same day, defendant Dotcheva stated that the year-over-year decline in gross profit margin experienced “was driven primarily by [Riskified’s] expansion into new industries and regions, increase of the tickets in travel industry as a percentage of total billings as well as the onboarding of new merchants”.

At the time of the filing of the complaint, Riskified Class A shares traded below $6 per share, more than 70% below the IPO price.

For more information on the Riskified class action go to: http://bespc.com/cases/RSKD

Netflix, Inc. (NASDAQ: NFLX)

Class Period: October 19, 2021 – April 19, 2022

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: July 5, 2022

On January 20, 2022, after the market closed, Netflix reported that it “slightly over-forecasted paid net adds in Q4,” adding 8.3 million subscribers compared to the 8.5 million forecast. The Company also stated that, despite “healthy” retention and engagement, it only expected to add 2.5 million net subscribers during first quarter 2022, below the 4.0 million net adds in the prior year period.

On this news, the Company’s stock price fell $110.75, or 21.7%, to close at $397.50 per share on January 21, 2022, on unusually heavy trading volume.

Then, on April 19, 2022, after the market closed, Netflix reported that it lost 200,000 subscribers during the first quarter of 2022, compared to prior guidance expecting the Company to add 2.5 million net subscribers. The Company cited the slowing revenue growth to four factors, including account sharing with an estimated 100 million additional households and competition with other streaming services.

On this news, the Company’s share price fell $122.42, or over 35%, to close at $226.19 per share on April 20, 2022, on unusually heavy trading volume.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts about the Company’s business, operations, and prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to investors: (1) that Netflix was exhibiting slower acquisition growth due to, among other things, account sharing by customers and increased competition from other streaming services; (2) that the Company was experiencing difficulties retaining customers; (3) that, as a result of the foregoing, the Company was losing subscribers on a net basis; (4) that, as a result, the Company’s financial results were being adversely affected; and (5) that, as a result of the foregoing, Defendants’ positive statements about the Company’s business, operations, and prospects were materially false and/or misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

For more information on the Netflix class action go to: http://bespc.com/cases/NFLX

Mullen Automotive, Inc. (NASDAQ: MULN)

Class Period: June 15, 2020 – April 6, 2022

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: July 5, 2022

On April 6, 2022, Hindenburg Research (“Hindenburg”) published a report addressing Mullen, entitled “Mullen Automotive: Yet Another Fast Talking EV Hustle”, calling the Company among the worst electric vehicle (“EV”) hustles that Hindenburg has seen in a crowded field of contenders such as Nikola Corporation and Lordstown Motors Corp. Among other things, Hindenburg observed that “[d]espite only spending ~$3 million in R&D in 2021, Mullen claims its solid-state battery technology is on track for commercialization in 18 to 24 months, putting it [a]head of every major technology and automaker in the industry who have collectively invested billions on solving the problem.” The Hindenburg report also alleged that the Chief Executive Officer of EV Grid, Inc. (“EV Grid”), which makes batteries and battery management systems for vehicles, refuted a press release issued by Mullen regarding test results for its battery, stating “[w]e never would have said that” and “[w]e never did say it and certainly wouldn’t have said it based on the results of testing that battery.” Additionally, the Hindenburg report alleged that Mullen’s claims to be in a joint venture with NextMetals Ltd. (“NextMetals”) to create a solid-state battery were refuted by a NextMetals senior executive who said it “‘was a nonstarter’ and ‘didn’t exist.'”

On this news, Mullen’s stock price fell $0.07 per share, or 2.57%, to close at $2.65 per share on April 6, 2022.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose: (1) Mullen overstates its ability and timeline regarding production; (2) Mullen overstates its deals with business partners, including Qiantu Motors; (3) Mullen overstates its battery technology and capabilities; (4) Mullen overstates its ability to sell its branded products; (5) Net Element did not conduct proper due diligence into Mullen Technologies; (6) the Dragonfly K50 was not (solely) delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic; and (7) as a result, defendants’ public statements were materially false and/or misleading at all relevant times. When the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

For more information on the Mullen class action go to: http://bespc.com/cases/MULN

About Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.:

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. is a nationally recognized law firm with offices in New York, California, and South Carolina. The firm represents individual and institutional investors in commercial, securities, derivative, and other complex litigation in state and federal courts across the country. For more information about the firm, please visit www.bespc.com. Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

Contact Information:

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.
Brandon Walker, Esq.
Melissa Fortunato, Esq.
(212) 355-4648
investigations@bespc.com
www.bespc.com